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1 
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici curiae are legal scholars with expertise in 
equal protection jurisprudence. Although amici sup-
port heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation-based 
classifications under the extant, tiered framework, 
they believe that the framework proposed here will 
enhance the clarity and accuracy of equal protection 
review, given the ever-increasing demographic and 
social complexity of the United States in the twenty-
first century. 
--------------------------------- i --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 This Court is at a crossroads in its equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. The problem lies not in what the 
Court has done in analyzing legislative classifications 
of groups of persons, but in the murkiness that has 
surrounded the articulation of which analytical prin-
ciples apply when invidious classifications are not 
traditionally suspect. As our Nation becomes ever 
 
 1 All parties have consented to the filing of all amicus 
curiae briefs by letters filed with the Clerk of Court. No counsel 
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. In addition, no 
persons or entities other than amici curiae, or their counsel 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of the brief. 
 Names of individual amici appear in the Appendix to this 
brief. 
2 
more diverse, the confusion for lower courts and the 
political branches generated by this lack of clarity 
will only worsen. 
 Building on precedents dating back to Carolene 
Products Footnote 4,2 there is a clear path forward for 
situations in which courts must examine group-based 
classifications that correlate with social stigma. Like 
Footnote 4, the analysis must be grounded in the 
particular facts surrounding a classification, recogniz-
ing that context often determines meaning. And by 
examining a classification in context, the review can 
be flexible enough to accommodate increasing social 
pluralism in American life as it evolves in ways that 
we cannot foresee. 
 Amici agree that deferential equal protection 
review is often appropriate because classification is 
intrinsic to governance, and most distinctions made 
in the context of economic and social policy merit 
judicial restraint. As is evident from precedent, how-
ever, the decisive factor for determining the stringen-
cy of review is not whether a policy is “economic or 
social” but whether the classification itself is tainted 
with prejudice or is patently arbitrary. When social 
prejudice is present, Footnote 4 and its progeny 
necessitate an appropriately searching judicial in-
quiry into whether the burdens imposed on a politi-
cally vulnerable minority are discontinuous with, and 
 
 2 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938). 
3 
disproportional to, the neutral public goals, if any, 
that are asserted as the purposes of the legislation. 
 In many respects, Justices Stevens and Marshall 
were surely correct that there is only one Equal 
Protection Clause, under which judicial review inevi-
tably operates along a spectrum.3 But a sliding scale, 
without more, does not provide a workable method for 
adjudication. The Court has the opportunity now to 
make explicit what has become muddied: that all 
classifications with the indicia of invidiousness trig-
ger a more searching inquiry than the standard of 
“deference” would imply. Traits that have already 
been marked for either strict or heightened scrutiny 
easily fit within this broader principle; indeed, the 
very design of the upper tiers aims to capture those 
classifications most likely to be invidious. 
 The sharp “all or nothing” dichotomy between 
classifications that are always or never suspicious no 
longer works in contemporary America as social dy-
namics and demographics have become increasingly 
complex. In response, amici propose a unifying, 
 
 3 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (“There is only one Equal Protection Clause.”); 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[This Court] has applied a 
spectrum of standards . . . [that] clearly comprehends variations 
in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize 
particular classifications, depending . . . on the constitutional 
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and 
the recognized invidiousness of the basis . . . [of] the particular 
classification.”). 
4 
coherent two-part equal protection test, which distin-
guishes between classifications that have the indicia 
of invidiousness and those that do not. The proposed 
test asks: 
Is the classification based on a trait that is 
associated with a broad or historical pattern 
of social prejudice, animus, or stereotyping or 
a trait that, as evidenced by the surrounding 
political context, is associated with acute 
political or social vulnerability?; and 
If yes, does the classification impose a 
burden that is discontinuous with, or dis-
proportionate to, its purported neutral justi-
fication? 
Per Footnote 4, more searching review follows for 
classifications that are likely to be invidious, while 
more deferential review applies to the rest. 
 The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) fails equal 
protection review under both the current and proposed 
tests. But because the more contextual approach 
presented here will be more capable of application to 
new situations, while also enhancing transparency 
and judicial accountability, amici urge its considera-
tion in this case. 
--------------------------------- i ---------------------------------   
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. Multiple Forms of Invidious Classifications, 
Including Those Not Traditionally Deemed 
Suspect, Such as Those Based on Sexual 
Orientation, Necessitate a More Trans-
parent Statement of the Court’s Existing 
Equal Protection Jurisprudence. 
 The lower federal courts and the parties to this 
case disagree on many points, but none is so central 
as the identification of which standard of review 
should apply to classifications based on sexual orien-
tation.4 The choice between deferential rational basis 
review, with its presumption that the statute at issue 
is constitutional, and heightened scrutiny, with its 
 
 4 Since this Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 583-85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (plurality opinion), 
which found laws criminalizing sexual conduct between same-
sex partners unconstitutional, federal courts have struggled 
with identifying the correct standard for sexual orientation 
classifications. Some have applied heightened scrutiny, see, e.g., 
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir.), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), or stated they believe it applies, 
see, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
333 (D. Conn. 2012). Many have utilized a more searching 
rational basis standard under which DOMA and other laws have 
been found unconstitutional, see, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
1052, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). Finally, other federal courts have 
used a rational basis standard under which sexual orientation 
classifications have been upheld. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal 
Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (referring to 
equal protection standard for sexual orientation classifications 
as “murky”). 
6 
presumption that the challenged form of discrimina-
tion is illegitimate, has not only become a doctrinal 
sorting mechanism but is also often seen as a proxy 
for moral judgment. Especially in cases, such as this 
one, that involve highly contentious social issues that 
tend to intensify public perceptions about what is at 
stake, it is important that the analytic process be 
forthright, with a framework that provides objective 
referents for assessing classifications. 
 The Court has long recognized that the rich 
diversity of the American population necessitates an 
equal protection standard that can accommodate 
forms of discrimination that were not specifically 
envisaged by the Reconstruction Framers. In United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), 
the Court articulated enduring principles for when 
the judiciary analyzes 
whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular reli-
gious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington 
v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, or racial minori-
ties, Nixon v. Herndon . . .: Nixon v. Condon 
. . .: whether prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the op-
eration of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect minorities. 
Id. at 153 n.4. These situations, the Court wrote, “may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
7 
inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 428; S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 
303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2, and cases cited.” Id. 
 While Footnote 4 is most often invoked for its 
concern with “discrete and insular minorities,” a close 
reading reinforces that its reach is far broader. Id. 
Examining Footnote 4’s text, in its context, establishes 
that today’s Court, in our context, must apply 
“a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry” 
whenever invidious classifications target a trait 
reflecting either historical or acute contemporary 
stigma for burdens that are discontinuous with, and 
disproportional to, the neutral public goals, if any, 
that are asserted as the purposes of the legislation. 
Id. 
 
A. Footnote 4’s Scalable Framework Re-
flects the Court’s Understanding, Re-
inforced by Experience, that Invidious 
Classifications Can Arise in a Wide 
Range of Contexts. 
 Footnote 4 establishes a scalable framework for 
analyzing invidious classifications that recent history 
has only made more necessary and that this Court 
has embraced, both explicitly for classifications now 
recognized as suspect and implicitly for more complex 
forms of discrimination. 
 In its first modern explication of the standards 
for judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications, this 
Court highlighted examples involving discrimination 
8 
based on characteristics that were disfavored in their 
particular time and place, in addition to characteris-
tics, such as race,5 that have been the enduring 
subjects of disfavor and were later labeled as suspect 
or quasi-suspect.6 These other examples included 
persons who were geographic outsiders in a particu-
lar state even though not members of an otherwise 
stigmatized group,7 Americans of German descent in 
the wake of World War I,8 and Asian-Americans in the 
Hawaiian Islands.9 In each instance, the need for 
close judicial attention arose from a context in which 
unpopular minorities were saddled with dispropor-
tionate burdens. 
 
 5 Two of the cited cases involved African-Americans whose 
voting rights were blocked in Texas Democratic Party primary 
elections. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 
273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
 6 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 7 S.C. State Highway, 303 U.S. 177. In Barnwell, the Court 
wrote: 
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose 
purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an 
advantage at the expense of those without, or to bur-
den those out of the state without any corresponding 
advantage to those within, have been thought to im-
pinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though 
Congress has not acted. 
Id. at 184-85 n.2. 
 8 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 
262 U.S. 404 (1923). 
 9 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
9 
 The cases cited in Footnote 4 regarding ethnic 
minorities grew out of a campaign against those 
groups that occurred in the United States between 
the world wars, a tool of which was to “bring foreign 
language schools under a strict governmental con-
trol.” Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298. In Meyer, the Court 
struck down a 1919 Nebraska statute forbidding the 
teaching of German to students before the eighth 
grade, overriding “[t]he desire of the Legislature to 
foster a homogeneous people,” 262 U.S. at 402, but 
the state then enacted a near-identical statute in 
1921. In Bartels, the Court ruled that the newer 
Nebraska law, in addition to similar laws from Ohio 
and Iowa, was unconstitutional. 262 U.S. at 409-11. 
When a 1922 Oregon statute prohibiting all private 
schools was challenged, state officials declined to 
defend it. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533 
(1925). In the last case in the series, the Court in 
Farrington invalidated a law that would have pro-
hibited significant instruction in Asian languages, 
primarily Japanese. 273 U.S. at 297-99. 
 By contrast, Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177 (1938), 
addressed the issue of legislative action imposing a 
burden on interstate commerce. The Court clarified 
that even in an ordinary commercial regulation, an 
invidious distinction disadvantaging geographic and 
political outsiders could be invalid. As the Court 
explained, “when the regulation is of such a character 
that its burden falls principally upon those without 
the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected 
to those political restraints which are normally 
10 
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some 
interests within the state.” Id. at 185 n.2. In Barn-
well, the Court also cited numerous other cases that 
similarly underscored the need for courts to be atten-
tive when reviewing legislative burdens that “fall[ ]  
principally” upon a group that, for whatever reasons, 
is relatively vulnerable in the political process. Id.10 
 These and other Footnote 4 citations illustrate 
the 1938 Court’s understanding that oppressive laws 
could vary in their specific manifestations of invidious-
ness. For some, such as the cases addressing restric-
tions on foreign language education, their placement 
in Footnote 4 foreshadows the more stringent scruti-
ny applied when invidiousness and an important 
interest co-exist. Indeed, Meyer and Pierce are now 
understood primarily as liberty, rather than equality, 
 
 10 The portion of Footnote 4 that cited Barnwell articulated 
the political process concern of the Court’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence: 
The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 provides 
simply that Congress shall have the power to regulate 
commerce among the states. But early on the Supreme 
Court gave this provision a self-operating dimension 
as well, one growing out of the same need to protect 
the politically powerless . . . . By thus constitutionally 
binding the interests of out-of-state manufacturers to 
those of local manufacturers represented in the legis-
lature, it provided political insurance that the taxes 
imposed on the former would not rise to a prohibitive 
or even an unreasonable level. 
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review 83-84 (1980). 
11 
decisions establishing the rights of parents to control 
the education of their children, even though the 
context of their citation in Footnote 4 reveals that the 
Court invoked them to illustrate the need to curb 
discriminatory laws.11 For others, such as Barnwell, 
their inclusion in Footnote 4 reinforces the Court’s 
recognition that invidious prejudice can exist inde-
pendently of demographic minorities.12 
 
B. The Social Complexity of Today’s 
America Illustrates the Enduring 
Wisdom of Footnote 4’s Open-Ended 
Approach. 
 The importance of heeding the wisdom of Footnote 
4’s approach has become more, not less, urgent with 
time. The United States in 1938 had a far less diverse 
population than it has today, as is evident even from 
the data regarding only the most prominent demo-
graphic groups, which shows exponential shifts in the 
 
 11 The text of Footnote 4 identifies the law at issue in Pierce 
as an example of discrimination against religious minorities, 
although the language of the opinion does not make explicit that 
aspect of the case. 
 12 See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 107 Yale L.J. 965, 1005 (1997) (“In a long list 
of later cases [after Carolene Products], the Court continued to 
consider the impact of ‘interest group participation’ in assessing 
legislation under the dormant Commerce Clause.”); see also Lisa 
Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
217, 251-52 (1995) (“The political process leading to the enact-
ment of laws that discriminate against outside commerce is an 
important theme of the Court’s decisions . . . .”). 
12 
breadth of racial and religious identifications of 
Americans.13 Nor is the trend toward a multicultural 
nation, with an accompanying wide range of interests 
and identities, likely to diminish.14 
 This growth in demographic diversity at a time 
when social movements have been similarly expansive 
has generated a wider range of cross-cutting identi-
ties and interests than ever before. Indeed, antidis-
crimination laws provide evidence of some of these 
shifts, with new laws enacted in recent decades to 
respond to discrimination based on numerous aspects 
of identity not traditionally designated as suspect. 
At the federal level, for example, laws now prohibit 
employment discrimination based on age, disability, 
and information about genetic predispositions.15 Some 
state legislatures have taken even broader note of 
 
 13 Compare, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States: 1948, at 19 (69th ed. 1948) with Karen R. 
Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez, U.S. Census 
Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010, at 7 tbl.3 
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/ 
c2010br-02.pdf; see also Pew Forum on Religion & Pub. Life, U.S. 
Religious Landscape Survey 5 (Feb. 2008), available at http:// 
religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full. 
pdf. 
 14 See Laura B. Shrestha & Elayne J. Heisler, Cong. 
Research Serv., RL 32701, The Changing Demographic Profile 
of the United States 12 tbl.2 (2011), available at http://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32701.pdf. 
 15 See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (2011); Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2006); Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). 
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types of discrimination not envisioned in 1938. In 
Edith Windsor’s home state of New York, for example, 
the human rights law also covers “sexual orientation, 
military status, . . . marital status, [and] domestic 
violence victim status.”16 
 Yet while many governments have expanded the 
bases for statutory protection as just described, laws 
such as these cannot keep pace with the exponential 
increase in diversity, the dynamics of contemporary 
social formation, and, as a result of these changes, 
the burgeoning array of equal protection claims that 
come before the federal courts.17 Cf. United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“As our society 
has become more complex, our numbers more vast, our 
lives more varied, and our resources more strained, 
citizens increasingly request the intervention of the 
 
 16 N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 2010). 
 17 Other Western democracies are experiencing the same 
kinds of change, and they, too, face challenges in revising 
antidiscrimination law to continue to fulfill its purposes. The 
European Convention on Human Rights, for example, denomi-
nates more categories for protection against discrimination than 
have been designated for strict or heightened scrutiny under the 
Constitution, but courts nonetheless continue to employ reason-
ing by analogy in order to retain the relevance of the antidis-
crimination principle. European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 
14, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (prohibiting discrimination “on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status”), interpreted in 
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309 
(1999), to also include sexual orientation. 
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courts on a greater variety of issues than at any 
period of our national development.”). 
 
C. Principles of Transparency and Judicial 
Accountability Also Support the Wisdom 
of Revisiting and Simplifying the Stan-
dard of Equal Protection Review. 
 Clarifying the framework that underlies equal 
protection review will enhance, not undermine, the 
jurisprudence of restraint. A test like the one pro-
posed here, which makes explicit the inquiries that 
are implicit in the Court’s cases, will streamline equal 
protection review in a way that is more responsive 
than the existing tiered framework to the surrounding 
environment of classifications. Lower courts particu-
larly will benefit as they face an increasing stream of 
classifications that are not traditionally suspect but 
may warrant more searching review consistent with 
the longstanding commitments articulated in Foot-
note 4. 
 Clearer guidance will also reinforce the impor-
tance of judicial restraint. The great fear associated 
with equal protection review is that courts will arbi-
trarily impose normative and policy preferences, 
rather than evaluate classifications based on princi-
pled consideration of objective referents. The process 
of articulating reasons why a classification may or 
may not be invidious in a particular factual context 
that is attentive to both stigma and burden, as 
required by the framework proposed by amici here, 
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will itself help screen out problematic rationaliza-
tions. 
 Justice Stevens’ forceful statement in Cleburne of 
the logic behind approaching equal protection review 
as a spectrum is consistent with, but less precise than, 
the approach presented here. See City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). Amici suggest framing the 
inquiries in a way that will implement the normative 
aspirations of the Equal Protection Clause, while also 
providing administrative workability. 
 
II. Invidious Classifications Should and Do 
Trigger a More Contextual Inquiry than 
the Sharply Dichotomous Tiered Frame-
work Can Provide. 
 No obligation of the sovereign is more fundamen-
tal than the duty to govern impartially, relying on 
legitimate and neutral criteria, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 
452 (Stevens, J., concurring), and to eschew assign-
ment of burdens and benefits based on status – based 
on “who someone is.” Our “Constitution ‘neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’ ” Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting)). Therefore, regardless of the standard 
applied or the designated tier of review, this Court 
has repeatedly found that the markings of invidious 
discrimination must trigger meaningful examination. 
Indeed, invidious line drawing is the exception to the 
16 
principle of deference to legislative bodies in all equal 
protection review. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (sustaining a 
law on legislative deference grounds), with U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) 
(refusing to defer to the legislature where an illegiti-
mate interest underlay the classification at issue). 
And the jurisprudence makes clear that legislatures 
cross that threshold when they differentiate among 
constituents “for the purpose of disadvantaging the 
group burdened by the law,” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
 Over time, this Court has catalogued the clearest 
and most odious kinds of prejudicial classifications 
into the tiered approach to equal protection analysis. 
Race, for example, “is the paradigm” of “classifica-
tions [that] in themselves supply a reason to infer 
antipathy,” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 272 (1979), hence its designation as suspect. The 
uppermost tiers express our Nation’s evolved sense of 
repugnance at the use of particular characteristics, 
such as race, to differentiate among Americans. They 
also implement that sense of repugnance with height-
ened scrutiny, which streamlines review of challenges 
to disparate treatment based on those antipathy-
laden classifications. This more rigorous form of 
review promotes administrative workability by creat-
ing the presumption that distinctions based on suspect 
and quasi-suspect characteristics reflect stereotypes 
about or hostility toward the burdened class. United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549-51 (1996). As the 
Court has explained regarding racial classifications, 
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for example, they “are simply too pernicious to permit 
any but the most exact connection between justifica-
tion and classification.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 The characteristics such as race and sex that are 
recognized as self-evidently suspicious do not exhaust 
the potential instances of invidious legislation, how-
ever.18 As noted almost sixty years ago, although 
“differences in race and color” have historically served 
as markers of discrimination, “community prejudices 
are not static, and from time to time other differences 
from the community norm may define other groups 
which need the same protection.” Hernandez v. Texas, 
347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954); cf. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 
448, 456 (1962) (selective enforcement violates the 
Constitution if “the selection was deliberately based 
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, 
or other arbitrary classification” (emphasis added)). 
 While this shifting social reality has precluded 
the formulation of one talismanic formula for equal 
protection review, the Court has maintained a focus 
on discerning and barring invidiousness in classi-
fications. In interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)’s pro-
hibition against intentional deprivations of equal 
 
 18 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 512-13, 528-31 (2004) (reviewing cases 
invalidated on invidiousness grounds and highlighting the 
Court’s longstanding concern with invidious class legislation). 
18 
protection of the laws, for example, the Court found 
that the statute’s intent requirement “means that 
there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the 
[defendant’s] action[s].” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 
U.S. 88, 102 (1971). The Court then elaborated the 
meaning of “invidious” in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s 
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993), citing with 
approval the dictionary definition as “[t]ending to 
excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; 
esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Webster’s Second International Dic-
tionary 1306 (1954)).19 The corollary term with which 
“invidious” is paired in Griffin – “animus” – may in 
addition reflect the insensitivity that arises from 
stereotyping or from the “simple want of careful, 
rational reflection.” Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
 
 19 This Court and lower courts also have linked invidious-
ness to an array of terms connoting unfair discrimination. See 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that the presumption of 
validity “gives way” when statute classifications “reflect “preju-
dice and antipathy”); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 
568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that, if irrational, 
a classification “must fall”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 
218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the implications of 
inferiority when a classification “add[s] to the burdens of an 
already disadvantaged discrete minority”); Welch v. Henry, 305 
U.S. 134, 144 (1938) (noting that hostility toward a group may 
be impermissible). Because proof of invidiousness is an element 
of a plaintiff ’s case in claims brought under § 1985(3), lower 
courts are accustomed to the term. See, e.g., Farber v. City of 
Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135-43 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). 
 The first inquiry in the framework proposed here 
emerges directly in response to the Court’s concern 
with invidiousness. It asks: Is the classification based 
on a trait that is associated with a broad or historical 
pattern of social prejudice, animus or stereotyping or a 
trait that, as evidenced by the surrounding political 
context, is associated with acute political or social 
vulnerability? 
 This inquiry, with its aim to discern the potential 
for invidiousness, does not require the Court to 
jettison its existing structure of categories of height-
ened scrutiny. Those categories exist because they 
reliably reflect manifestations of invidiousness that, 
over long periods of time, we have come to recognize 
as unacceptable in our constitutional democracy. 
Invoking an anti-invidiousness principle, rather than 
a list of specific characteristics, however, would 
provide a better explanation of the need for meaning-
ful review when indicia that have traditionally been 
deemed suspect are not present. Justice O’Connor 
reinforced this point: “When a law exhibits such a 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have 
applied a more searching form of rational basis 
review . . . .” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 Invidious classifications will often be marked by 
some of the same indicia currently associated with 
heightened or strict scrutiny, such as being based on 
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a trait that has been subjected to “a ‘history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment’ ” or having the effect of 
imposing disadvantages based on “stereotyped char-
acteristics not truly indicative of [group members’] 
abilities,” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
313 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). But greater flexibil-
ity will allow for more principled adjudication – based 
on what the Court has already done in many cases – 
of situations in which classifications may be justifia-
ble in one context but not in another. People with 
developmental disabilities, for example, may elicit 
contradictory legislative responses of “irrational 
prejudice”20 or solicitude,21 depending on the situation. 
Residency requirements, likewise, may establish 
legitimate eligibility criteria22 or may reflect “dis-
criminat[ion] against out-of-state commerce or new 
residents.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 
2073, 2080 (2012) (characterizing Hooper v. Bernalillo 
Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. 
Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); and Zobel v. Williams, 457 
 
 20 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
 21 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730-32 (1997). 
 22 Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (upholding 
bona fide residency requirements for free primary and secondary 
schooling); McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645, 
647 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding continuing residency re-
quirements for municipal employment against equal protection 
challenge). 
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U.S. 55 (1982)).23 With a growing number of social 
minorities, whose memberships increasingly overlap, 
this flexibility is essential. 
 There are other, rare instances when a classifica-
tion may be so arbitrary as to raise concerns about a 
possible equal protection violation even though it is 
not related to a socially stigmatized characteristic or 
a characteristic that is otherwise disadvantaged in 
the political process.24 The flexibility of the proposed 
framework can also accommodate these outliers. But 
the situation that has produced the greatest constitu-
tional uncertainty has been where courts are asked to 
evaluate classifications based on characteristics, such 
as sexual orientation, that have not formally been 
designated as suspicious but which are known to be 
frequently linked to stigma.25 See supra note 2. As the 
 
 23 The form of invidiousness in these cases may be described 
as “protectionism – a desire to protect in-staters at the expense 
of out-of-staters.” Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 14, 59 (1996). 
 24 See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 
(2000) (per curiam) (“[The] complaint can fairly be construed as 
alleging that the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot 
easement as a condition of connecting her property to the 
municipal water supply where the Village required only a 15-
foot easement from other similarly situated property owners.”); 
see also id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring) (revealing that the 
factual context included allegations of “ ‘vindictive action,’ 
‘illegitimate animus,’ and ‘ill will’ ” (citation omitted)). 
 25 Alternatively, amici agree with a more narrow argument 
that sexual orientation classifications should be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185 (finding quasi-
suspect class criteria satisfied “based on the weight of the 
(Continued on following page) 
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Court of Appeals in the instant case noted with some 
understatement, “it is safe to say that there is some 
doctrinal instability in this area.” Windsor, 699 F.3d 
at 181. 
 Petitioner Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(Petitioner or BLAG) would disable this Court from 
acknowledging the social realities behind varying 
forms of class-based legislation by seeking an un-
thinking and unvarying application of the most 
deferential equal protection standard. Citing cases in 
which either no indicia of invidiousness were present 
in the context at issue26 or in which a trait-based 
classification was in fact struck down as violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause,27 BLAG strings together 
a series of quotes to argue that, absent strict scrutiny, 
“ ‘the Constitution presumes that even improvident 
decisions will eventually be rectified by the demo-
cratic process,’ ”28 “ ‘judicial intervention is generally 
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a 
 
factors and on analogy to the classifications recognized as 
suspect and quasi-suspect”). 
 26 Brief in Opposition at 4, Windsor v. United States, No. 12-
307 (U.S. cert. granted Dec. 7, 2012) (citing FCC v. Beach 
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993); Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979)). 
 27 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
 28 Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 28, 
Windsor v. United States, No. 12-307 (U.S. cert. granted Dec. 7, 
2012) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440). 
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political branch has acted’ ”29 and “Congress’ decision 
where to draw the line is ‘virtually unreviewable.’ ”30 
If these decontextualized platitudes were true, this 
Court’s decisions in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer 
would not – could not – exist. 
 To properly interpret the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Court should continue its refusal to engage in 
such willful blindness. Contrary to the arguments of 
BLAG and its supporting amici, it need not fear that 
taking account of the stigmatization and stereotyping 
associated with a trait that is subjected to legislative 
disadvantage will jeopardize the capacity of govern-
ment to function in the future, as it has not in the 
past. Markers of invidiousness rarely occur in the 
mine run of legislation involving “ordinary commer-
cial transactions.” Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. 
 The reformulated equal protection standard pro-
posed here will not produce routine second-guessing 
of legislative authority to regulate a wide variety of 
economic and social matters. But the jurisprudential 
guideline favoring restraint does not bar the Court 
from taking a closer look when the classification itself 
reveals that a disfavored, often small, group has been 
scapegoated as the cause of broader social anxieties, 
or used as fodder for the creation of a wedge issue. 
Simply put, no floodgates for challenges to legisla- 
tive line-drawing between landlords and tenants, 
 
 29 Id. (quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 97). 
 30 Id. at 30 (quoting Beach, 508 U.S. at 316). 
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mortgagors and mortgagees, or cable facilities that 
serve units under common or separate ownership will 
swing open if this Court engages in a meaningful 
inquiry into the constitutionality of the invidious 
exclusion created by DOMA. 
 Instead, where groups are politically unpopular, 
either nationally or locally – as gay people were when 
Congress passed DOMA and when voters approved 
Amendment 2 in Colorado; as people with develop-
mental disabilities were when a small town in Texas 
imposed uniquely burdensome zoning rules on them; 
and as hippies were when the Department of Agricul-
ture adopted its restrictive food stamp rule – the risk 
of invidious classification masked by benign-sounding 
rationales runs high and the most deferential forms 
of review are no longer appropriate. See, e.g., Romer, 
517 U.S. 620; Moreno, 413 U.S. 528; Cleburne, 473 
U.S. 432. 
 There are times, as here, when the most salient 
concern is that legislative processes may not have 
operated impartially. In such situations, courts must 
serve their essential function in our constitutional 
democracy as the sole branch of national government 
that is unelected. “[W]hen the fervor of political 
passions moves the Executive and the Legislative 
branches to act in ways inimical to basic constitu-
tional principles, it is the duty of the judiciary to 
intervene.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 
F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, C.J., concur-
ring). That same duty attaches here, where Congress 
has excluded one subset of married couples from the 
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federal scheme of marriage recognition and regula-
tion based on a trait that has long been subjected to 
social and political disfavor. 
 
III. When a Classification Exhibits the Indicia 
of Invidiousness, Courts Examine Whether 
It Is Discontinuous with, or Creates a 
Burden that Is Disproportionate to, Its 
Purported Neutral Justification. 
 Examination of the legislative purpose and the 
nexus between that purpose and the classification, as 
well as the relationship between the purpose and the 
burden imposed by the classification, will often reveal 
whether the government’s reliance on a socially 
disfavored trait must be invalidated.31 A justification 
that may be legitimate in the abstract, but does not 
 
 31 In a handful of cases, the Court has found that the total 
absence of a legitimate purpose or a radical disconnect between 
ends and means can render a law unconstitutional because a 
classification is patently arbitrary, even without the indicia of 
invidiousness. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. 
Comm’n of Webster Cnty., 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) (noting 
“intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials” led to 
gross disparity in property tax rates (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-
09 (1966) (finding that a law requiring only those indigent 
persons whose appeals were unsuccessful to repay court costs 
failed to meet the standard that there must be “some rationality 
in the nature of the class singled out”). Such cases are analogous 
to those in which the invidiousness of a particular trait is so 
clear from the face of a statute and so unrelated to ability or 
merit that consideration of its relationship to the particular 
legislative goal is unnecessary. 
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explain why the trait in question had been singled 
out for legislative burden in the particular context at 
issue, will not suffice. To pass muster under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a “classificatory scheme must 
‘rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable 
governmental objective.’ ” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1, 1516 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981)). 
 Thus the second inquiry in the framework pro-
posed here asks: Does the classification impose a 
burden that is discontinuous with, or disproportionate 
to, its purported neutral justification? 
 
A. Meaningful Review of a Classification 
with the Indicia of Prejudice or Stereo-
types Requires Inquiry into the Law’s 
Purpose and the Relationship Between 
Legislative Goals and the Basis for the 
Classification under Challenge. 
 This Court has required that classifications re-
flect genuinely “legitimate public concerns,” Palmore 
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); see also Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000), rather than antipa-
thy toward a minority. When the signs of prejudice or 
stereotyping are present, as they are in the case at 
bar, the Court has been especially vigilant in examin-
ing the proffered rationales for the classification. See, 
e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 
(2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (regarding the need 
to “strike down a government classification that is 
clearly intended to injure a particular class of private 
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parties, with only incidental or pretextual public 
justifications”). 
 In Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, for example, the Court 
found that a ban on antidiscrimination protections for 
gay people could not be justified by benign-sounding 
references to cost-saving and protecting associational 
rights when its actual purpose was far more likely to 
have been instantiation of an inferior status. Similarly, 
in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50, the Court found that 
concerns about a flood plain could not explain why 
homes for people with mental retardation were re-
stricted while other group homes were not. And in 
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537-38, the Court rejected super-
ficially neutral rationales for refusing food stamps to 
people living with unrelated others – a purported 
government interest in stimulating agriculture and 
minimizing fraud – finding that they masked an 
underlying and impermissible hostility toward hip-
pies. 
 Conversely, a direct relationship between a 
legislative goal and the classification will bolster the 
constitutionality of a law. In Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471, 473-75 (1970), for example, the Court 
reviewed a Maryland statute that classified based on 
family size in setting the amount of welfare payments 
by capping the amount due any one family rather 
than by calculating the amount on a per-child basis. 
The Court found that the classification by family size 
was “free from invidious discrimination,” id. at 487, 
and legitimately grounded in the state’s interest in 
encouraging employment and avoiding an end result 
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that would discriminate against “families of the work-
ing poor.” Id. at 486. 
 
B. Laws That Impose a Burden out of 
Proportion to the Legislative Goal, 
Based on Classifications with the 
Markings of Invidiousness, Also Violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
 Even where a proper fit exists between legisla-
tive ends and means, a gross disparity between the 
burden created by the classification and the public 
benefit that is the ostensible legislative purpose may 
nonetheless doom the law. The Court has noted this 
link between a disproportionate burden on a group of 
people and the risk that invidious discrimination has 
occurred: “If a state law disproportionately burdened 
a particular class of religious observers, this circum-
stance might be evidence of an impermissible legisla-
tive motive.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
535 (1997). 
 The disproportionality principle explains cases 
that otherwise appear difficult to catalog because 
they involve non-suspect classifications that can be, 
depending on the context, invidious, and where a 
burden is imposed on a liberty interest that is im-
portant but not fundamental. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 202, 223 (1982), for example, the Court 
noted that the immigration status of undocumented 
resident children was a legitimate basis for classifica-
tion, yet their exclusion from public schools would 
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produce “a lifetime [of] hardship” with the “stigma of 
illiteracy [that] will mark them for the rest of their 
lives,” and struck down a law barring this group of 
children from schools. 
 The Court has similarly found equal protection 
violations when laws have imposed a disproportion-
ate burden on low-income persons, although poverty 
itself is not a suspect classification. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. at 25. Four years after Carolene Products, the 
Court struck down a statute that allowed sterilization 
of habitual larcenists, but not habitual embezzlers, 
stressing both the heavy burden on the right to bear 
children and the invidiousness of a classification so 
linked to economic class. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). “When the law 
lays an unequal hand on those who have committed 
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes 
one and not the other, it has made as an invidious a 
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race 
or nationality for oppressive treatment,” the Court 
wrote. Id. When participation in government was at 
stake, the Court struck another wealth-linked classi-
fication: “[I]t is a form of invidious discrimination to 
require land ownership of all appointees to a body 
authorized to propose reorganization of local govern-
ment.” Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 107 (1989); see 
also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (strik-
ing down requirement of a filing fee for candidates in 
local primary elections). 
 In several other cases, a classification that allo-
cated burdens in a way that further disadvantaged 
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low-income persons was invalidated in light of its 
impact on the criminal or civil justice system. As the 
Court has explained, “[i]n criminal trials a State can 
no more discriminate on account of poverty than on 
account of religion, race, or color.” Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956); accord Douglas v. California, 
372 U.S. 353, 355, 357-58 (1963). Although there is no 
absolute constitutional right to appeal, for example, 
the Court struck down economic barriers to pursuing 
an appeal in both criminal and civil cases that in-
volved important liberty interests. In Griffin, the 
Court required states to furnish indigent criminal 
defendants with free trial transcripts on appeal. The 
same obligation was imposed for indigent appellants 
in parental termination cases. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 
519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996); cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (finding it unconstitu-
tional for a state not to permit waiver of filing fees for 
indigent persons in divorce cases). 
 The underlying principle that greater burdens 
require more persuasive justifications provides one of 
the anchors of constitutional jurisprudence, and is 
found across multiple doctrines. In the realm of equal 
protection, for example, the Court has developed a 
concept of “proportionality and congruence between 
the means adopted and the legitimate end to be 
achieved” in assessing whether Congress has exceed-
ed its authority in enacting remedial legislation. 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. The limitation on Congress’ 
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause must 
surely be at least matched by a comparable boundary 
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to mark when Congress has violated the same provi-
sion. Similarly, under the Due Process Clause, states 
have flexibility in permitting the use of punitive 
damages to penalize and deter tortious conduct, but a 
punitive damages award may run afoul of basic 
fairness concerns if it can “fairly be categorized as 
‘grossly excessive’ in relation” to those goals. BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). The 
guideposts that lower courts use to determine whether 
an award is grossly excessive include the reprehensi-
bility of the defendant’s conduct and the proportional-
ity between the award and the harm suffered by 
plaintiff. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). 
 In sum, the Court has brought to bear a more 
searching inquiry into the logic and appropriateness 
of how a legislature uses its power to classify groups 
of people when there are indicia of invidiousness, 
including a missing nexus between the ends and 
means of a law or the imposition of a burden that is 
disproportionate to the benefit that the law is likely 
to convey. In doing so, the Court has recognized the 
importance of calibrating the degree of stringency in 
its review to importance of the constitutional values 
at issue. 
 
IV. DOMA Fails Any Level of Equal Protection 
Review. 
 DOMA mandates the singling out of a subclass 
of lawfully married persons for disqualification as 
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married for purposes of any federal law. It is ground-
ed in the invidious targeting of a socially stigmatized 
minority. And the burden it imposes by depriving 
married same-sex couples and their children of all 
federal recognition is both discontinuous with and 
disproportionate to any legitimate, neutral public pur-
pose. DOMA thus fails any level of equal protection 
review, including under the standard proposed here. 
 There can be no serious question about the 
degree of stigma historically associated with homo-
sexuality. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-
97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Condemnation 
of [homosexual] practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-
Christian moral and ethical standards.”); cf. Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“[F]or centuries there have 
been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct 
as immoral.”). As in Romer, where the Court found 
that the primary purpose of the law was discrimina-
tion per se, in this case, one way to reveal the invidi-
ousness at work is to ask whether DOMA’s exclusion 
would have been enacted if any group of married 
heterosexual couples were subject to it: for example, 
couples beyond child-bearing age or in which one or 
both partners had been sterilized. This inquiry does 
not probe whether the law could be more perfectly 
attuned to the stated purpose, but rather whether the 
law would have ever been enacted at all without its 
invidious distinction. “Our salvation is the Equal 
Protection Clause, which requires the democratic 
majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones 
what they impose on you and me.” Cruzan v. Dir. of 
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Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). The extreme unlikelihood that such a 
law regulating recognition of marriages would affect 
anyone except same-sex couples demonstrates the 
extreme likelihood that the primary purpose behind 
this exclusion was simply to exclude this particular 
group. 
 Nor can BLAG identify genuinely neutral pur-
poses served by DOMA’s exclusion of this one group of 
couples. Rather, DOMA’s effect is to impose harsh and 
unnecessary burdens that are not justified by a 
legitimate purpose but instead simply deny these 
persons access to the federal programs that track the 
obligations of interdependency to which they are 
already being held under state law. 
 BLAG’s primary assertion appears to be that the 
federal government can limit its recognition of exist-
ing marriage to relationships most associated with 
procreative capacity – even if only hypothetically. Yet 
DOMA’s broad scope sweeps across hundreds of 
statutes (and perhaps thousands of regulations) that 
shape a wide range of substantive policy areas. 
Consequently, there is striking discontinuity between 
DOMA’s breadth and its purported interests, whether 
in procreation and parenting, uniformity, or any of 
BLAG’s other implausibly hypothesized purposes. Its 
enormous impact also highlights how out of propor-
tion its burden is to any likely public benefit. 
 For example, the desire to police the definition of 
marriage because of its association with procreation 
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bears little relationship to the many social welfare 
laws affected by DOMA. There is simply no link be-
tween child-raising and many of the federal programs 
that DOMA forecloses, such as immigration catego-
ries, surviving spouse benefits, and health insurance 
and pension benefits for the spouses of federal employ-
ees, as well as countless collateral programs unrelat-
ed to procreation in which DOMA itself is generating 
new instances of gratuitous discrimination.32 
 In general, the structure of benefits programs is 
not a proper venue for federal resolution of a com-
petition among states over differing definitions of 
marriage or beliefs as to socially acceptable family 
structures for childrearing. “ ‘[T]he relationships 
among persons constituting one economic unit and 
sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with [the 
purposes of the Food Stamp Act,] their abilities to 
stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing 
farm surpluses, or with their personal nutritional 
requirements.” Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (quoting U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 
(D.D.C. 1972)). 
 
 32 For example, a military wives group at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, was told that it could not admit the wife of a lesbian 
officer because DOMA forbids recognition of same-sex marriages 
by any federal government entity. The Associated Press, Wife of 
Female Army Officer Can Join Spouses Club, USA Today (Jan. 
26, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2013/01/26/army-military-bragg-gay/1866019/. 
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 Moreover, the animating impulse behind DOMA, 
even when families with children are at issue, is not 
consonant with the purposes and functions of many of 
the federal programs that it affects. For example, 
DOMA distorts the Social Security survivor benefits 
program, “the primary purpose [of which] is to pay 
benefits in accordance with the probable needs of the 
beneficiaries,” based on the “years worked and amount 
earned by a covered employee.” Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 644, 647 (1975); see also Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 (1972) 
(“[T]he fact of a child’s birth out of wedlock bore no 
reasonable relation to the purpose of wrongful-death 
statutes which compensate children for the death of a 
mother.”). 
 Petitioner’s attempt to reframe the motivation 
behind DOMA into a neutral one designed to incen-
tivize heterosexual couples to marry, rather than to 
demean married same-sex couples, smacks of ration-
alizing an attempt “to mandate [Congress’] own moral 
code.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 850 (1992). The exclusion of same-sex 
couples from recognition as married will not affect 
whatever incentives may succeed in influencing the 
behavior of heterosexual couples.33 As this Court 
 
 33 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home 
Affairs 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) para. 56 (S. Afr.) (finding “there is no 
rational connection between the exclusion of same-sex life 
partners from the benefits under [South African law] and the 
government interest sought to be achieved thereby, namely the 
(Continued on following page) 
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noted in response to a similarly illogical argument: 
“Nor can it be thought . . . that persons will shun 
illicit relations because the offspring may not one day 
reap the benefits of workmen’s compensation.” Weber, 
406 U.S. at 173. 
 DOMA’s impact on children is even more discon-
tinuous with BLAG’s asserted aims, as its only effect 
is to harm the children of married same-sex couples 
by denying them the benefits to which they would 
otherwise be entitled. Of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) persons, 49% of women and 19% 
of men are raising a child.34 Same-sex couples with 
children are nearly twice as likely as non-LGBT per-
sons with children to report household incomes near 
the poverty threshold of $24,000 per year.35 Some 
portion of these children are rendered ineligible by 
DOMA for benefits that they would otherwise receive, 
because their parents’ marriage is not recognized 
under federal law. 
 BLAG’s claim that DOMA is justified by an 
interest in federal uniformity regarding marriage rec-
ognition also suffers from discontinuity with DOMA’s 
actual effects. That is, the purported interest in uni-
formity fails equal protection’s baseline requirement 
 
protection of families and the family life of heterosexual spous-
es”). 
 34 Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, The 
Williams Institute (2013), available at http://williamsinstitute. 
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf. 
 35 Id. 
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that a legitimate explanation exists for burdening 
some people but not others. Notably, the invocation of 
a benign-sounding concern for uniformity in an 
attempt to justify restricting the rights of lesbians 
and gay men is not new. In Romer, the defenders of 
Colorado’s ban on civil rights laws for gay people 
similarly argued that they were merely trying to 
achieve a uniform approach to sexual orientation 
laws in the state. See Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-
7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *3 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 
1993). But, just as “uniformity” could not adequately 
explain why Colorado restricted only gay rights 
measures, so too it cannot explain why the federal 
government accepts the variability and dis-uniformity 
among state marriage laws except vis-à-vis same-sex 
couples. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) 
(describing marriage as “a virtually exclusive prov-
ince of the States”). 
 The same is true for cost-savings. While the gov-
ernment no doubt has a legitimate interest in saving 
money, the question for equal protection purposes is 
whether that interest can explain the refusal to 
recognize same-sex couples’ marriages or whether 
that goal is too discontinuous with the burden DOMA 
imposes. Cost-savings could arguably justify any gov-
ernment action, but, as with uniformity, there is no 
nexus between this rationale and the trait targeted 
by DOMA. Without that linkage, the designation of 
same-sex couples to serve the government’s fiscal 
interest lacks any neutral justification. Saving money 
“ ‘cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification,’ ” 
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this Court has explained. Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)). Nor can it transform a 
sweeping federal ban on recognition of same-sex 
couples’ marriages, replete with numerous laws that 
have no relation to federal spending, into a measure 
tailored to prevent the extension of certain financial 
benefits for married couples who had not previously 
enjoyed them. Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“find[ing] it 
impossible to credit” the state’s “interest in conserv-
ing resources” as an explanation for why it had 
banned legal protection only for gay people); Plyler, 
457 U.S. at 227 (similarly rejecting cost-savings 
argument). 
 Tradition, too, lacks the explanatory power 
required by equal protection. If tradition for its own 
sake could justify the government’s burdening of 
particular classes, particularly when there is a history 
of governmental discrimination against the group 
that is now recognized as improper, virtually all 
historically-rooted classifications could be sustained. 
For this reason, the Court has repeatedly rejected the 
tradition rationale. Cf. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 
327 (1993) (“Ancient lineage of a legal concept does 
not give it immunity from attack for lacking a ration-
al basis.”); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 
1, 18 (1991) (“[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor 
the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence 
to it through the centuries insulates it from constitu-
tional attack . . . .” (alterations in original) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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 In the end, DOMA “classifies [lawfully married] 
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end 
but to make them unequal to everyone else. This 
[Congress] cannot do.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
--------------------------------- i --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae urge this 
Court to affirm the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
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